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Abstract ‘Feminist geopolitics’ offers a critical framework for analyzing the events and
aftermath of September 11th. This grid of intelligibility seeks to provide a more
accountable, embodied understanding of intersections of power and space at multiple
scales. It challenges the logic of either/or reasoning, and related responses to September
11th. The escalation of violence, such that terror begets more terror, is not the only possible
response to the murder and destruction in New York City and Washington, yet the
dominant geopolitical discourse leads us to believe it is. Critical and feminist geopolitics
are crucial if we are to go beyond the binaries and establish a third space of 'neither/nor'.
Finally, to generate a more accountable and embodied political vision, feminist geopolitics
is employed in relation to body counts at two distinct geographical and geopolitical sites.
The events and aftermath of September 11th ineluctably ended the already
precarious distinction between domestic space, that within a sovereign state, and more
global space where transnational networks, international relations, multilateral institutions,
and global corporations operate. If it existed, any comfortable distinction between
domestic and international, here and there, us and them, ceased to have meaning after that
day. Acts of violence perpetrated by people who entered the country legally from states
outside the US, using domestic aircraft, imploded any notion that political borders contain
political conflict. Feminists have long argued that private-public distinctions serve to
depoliticize the private domestic spaces of ‘home’ compared to more public domains.  The
attacks certainly exposed the limitations of ‘domestic’ space, somehow bounded and
separated from the processes and politics of economic, cultural, and political integration.
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This paper interrogates highly the spatialized imaginary of politics and violence in the
context of September 11th.
Writing about ‘spaces of terror’ is a daunting task, in part because the political
landscape 'post 9-11' changes from one week to the next, and also because no analysis can
capture the loss or pain experienced by those affected by such events. While I do aim to
analyze the events and aftermath of September 11th, I also want to position myself
politically in relation to the violence they embody. To my mind, nothing justified the
killing of innocent people on September 11th. Nothing justifies the retaliatory killing of
innocent people anywhere else. The perpetrators of such destruction and killing should be
brought to justice, though I lament the fact that no civilian venue has yet been identified.2
Equally, I do not condone US and British bombing in Afghanistan, which has killed
uncounted civilians and imperiled the lives of hundreds of thousands more. Such
'collateral damage', as these deaths are euphemistically referred to by the perpetrators, are
unlikely to ever be prosecuted. Terror in the US on September 11th has been met with
more terror in Afghanistan since October 7th, continuing into 2002.3
The surge of insecurity experienced by Americans after the attacks has been stoked
by fears of anthrax infection and repeat attacks. In this climate of fear, public consent has
been mobilized to reconstitute the country as a bounded area that can be fortified against
outsiders and other global influences. In this imagining of nation, the US ceases to be a
constellation of local, national, international, and global relations, experiences, and
meanings that coalesce in places like New York City and Washington DC; rather, it is
increasingly defined by a ‘security perimeter’ and the strict surveillance of borders. Such
notions of place as bounded space have been displaced by more cosmopolitan and less
static geographical notions of place: "what gives a place its specificity is not some long
internalized history but the fact that it is constructed out of a particular constellation of
social relations, meeting and weaving together at a particular locus…. It is, indeed, a
meeting place (Massey, 1997: 322).4 In contrast, bounded thinking about discrete places
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 In November 2001, President Bush signed an order creating special military tribunals
where foreigners charged with terrorism could be tried in secret (Dao, 2001). Mr. Bush would
personally determine who is tried, and cases would be heard before juries of military officers, not
jurors (The Globe and Mail, 2001). Verdicts may include the death penalty, and the tribunals
include no appeals process. The authority of such tribunals to facilitate due process and mete out
justice under the rule of law is, accordingly, very limited.
3
 As noted, the perpetrators of the crimes committed on September 11th should be captured
and brought to justice. I contend, however, that intelligence networks and targeted covert police
operations informed by such networks would minimize the terror experienced by civilians who
otherwise risk becoming casualties.
4
 The popular, if fictionalized, imaginings of the nation and its vulnerable borders were
televised in the season’s premiere of the US political teledrama, The West Wing. In the episode, the
White House is shut down due to a security breach, with specific reference to a terrorist threat at the
Ontario - Vermont border. The threat attests to a widespread feeling at the time that the Canadian
border was linked to the attacks of September 11th, and while no evidence to date has shown this to
be the case, the US has pledged to triple border patrols along this border. Given the focus on
geopolitics in this paper, this story is amusing because the Ontario - Vermont border is itself a
fiction; Vermont is contiguous only with Québec, but this is irrelevant. The amorphous ‘Canada’ is
the weak link in the security perimeter propagated further by the show. Like the highly satirical
Beyond Either/Or 3
has had concrete implications for airline security, immigration and visitor visa regulations
(in the US and Canada), and customs control, especially at the land border between the US
and Canada. But it has more reactionary, if less tangible, implications for American
politics, US immigrants, and questions of how ‘civil’ society should be. Anti-terrorist
legislation, anti-immigrant rhetoric, and public support for a military response are as much
an expression of outrage and insecurity as they are evidence of government resolve and a
heightened need for increased security in the face of heinous attacks of September 11th.
What has been disturbing, however, is the shrinking space and number of venues available
for open dialogue about the attacks and responses to them. I attempt to reclaim some of
this space by calling for what might be thought of as a feminist geopolitics, a more
accountable and embodied notion of politics that analyzes the intersection of power and
space at multiple scales, one that eschews violence as a legitimate means to political ends
(Hyndman, 2001).
In what follows, I outline the theoretical underpinnings of what I refer to as
feminist geopolitics, tracing its antecedents in critical geopolitics and feminist critiques of
international relations theory. Employing this analytical framework, I construct a political
space beyond the binary logic of 'either/or' and advocate more embodied ways of seeing
and knowing by examining the casualties in the wars of/on terrorism.
Feminist Geopolitics
For the purpose of this article, I define ‘feminist’ as analyses and political
interventions that address the inequitable and violent relationships of power among people
and places based on real or perceived differences. While gender remains a central concern
of feminist politics and thought, its primacy over other social, political, and economic
locations is not fixed across time and place. Feminist geopolitics attempts to develop a
politics of security at multiple scales, including that of the (civilian) body. It decentres
state security, the conventional subject of geopolitics, and contests the militarization of
states and societies with a 'world system' perspective. It seeks embodied ways of seeing
and material notions of protection for people on the ground. Feminist geopolitics is not a
new theory of geopolitics nor a new ordering of space (Hyndman, 2001). It is an analytic
and politics that is contingent upon context, place, and time. Just as place is constituted at
multiple scales (Massey, 1997), so too is geopolitics.
Within geography, Eleonore Kofman imagines a feminist geopolitics as one which
would incorporate feminist analyses and gender into an extant set of geopolitical practices.
The most successful incorporation of feminist insights and gender issues
into geopolitics would dismantle and democratize geopolitics such that it
no longer involved the personnel of statecraft located with the most
repressive echelons of the state. Real groups would then begin to figure in
the landscapes and maps of the global economy and power relations.
Geopolitics would open out into a broader context which we could call
global political geography, in which comparative analyses and the local,
however that is defined, would also be included (Kofman, 1996: 218).
                                                                                                                                        
South Park film of 1999, ‘Blame Canada’ is as obvious as it is ludicrous. The South Park television
series also produced a cutting critique of the US response to September 11th in its 2001 season
opener.
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Kofman's description of feminist geopolitics is uniquely situated within both political and
feminist geography. It aspires to a less punitive version of the state-centric realist
geopolitics. It also tacitly identifies a gap in the geographical literature: that the scale at
which security is generally conceptualized precludes collective concerns, civil groups, and
individual protection. A feminist geopolitics might be viewed at once as a critical
approach and a contingent set of political practices operating at multiple scales that
include, but are not restricted to, the nation-state (Hyndman, 2001).
Feminist geopolitics owes a significant debt to feminists in political science who
have developed substantial critiques of international relations theory (Whitworth, 1994;
Enloe, 1989, 2000; Pettman 1996; Peterson 1992, 1996). These authors, among others,
have provided sustained and incisive critiques of international relations (IR) theory.
Feminist critiques of security, for example, challenge the tacit territorial assumptions of
states by asking whether states actually render their populations secure (see Peterson,
1992). Many of these analyses, however, have failed to go beyond the neo-realist
narratives of international relations. That is, feminist critics and IR proponents alike are
working within a singular problematic of modern geopolitics. While a few feminist critics
of IR are interested in taking apart this dominant discourse (Weber, 1994), most are
engaged in a more oppositional stance in relation to IR and modern geopolitics.
Critical geopolitics, however, as a sub-field of political geography aims to fill this
gap. Critical geopolitics emerged in the late 1980s, and provides a useful departure point
for making sense of the responses to September 11th. Critical geopolitics is a less a theory
of how space and politics intersect than a taking apart of normalized categories and
narratives of geopolitics. It is about questioning assumptions in a taken-for-granted world
and examining the institutional modes of producing such a world vis-à-vis writing about
the world, its geography and politics.
This sub-field of political geography is about suspending modernist assumptions of
pre-given centres from which politics and knowledge are constructed and meaning
imposed (Dalby, 1991). It analyzes the discursive practices by which scholars spatialize
international politics in a single world characterized by specific groups of people, places,
and stories.  Within geography, “[c]ritical geopolitics is one of many cultures of resistance
to Geography as imperial truth, state-capitalized knowledge, and military weapon. It is a
small part of a much larger rainbow struggle to decolonize our inherited geographical
imagination so that other geo-graphings and other worlds might be possible” (Ò Tuathail,
1996: 256). This struggle to create other possible worlds overlaps with the project of
feminist geopolitics.
While critical geopolitics is useful for a feminist geopolitical analysis, its
deconstructive impulses are to my mind insufficient to generate change for building
alternative futures. Critical geopolitics decentres the nation-state and exposes the
investments that our dominant geopolitical narratives embody, but it doesn’t put Humpty
Dumpty back together again, so to speak. Nor does it question why Humpty is always
falling off the wall. We are left with well-interrogated categories, but no clear way
forward in practice (Hyndman, 2001).
A feminist imaginary invokes a universe of politically possible interventions,
actions, and alliances, but its subject is neither postmodern nor universal. The distinction
between a universe of potential modes of engagement (my notion of feminist geopolitics)
and universalist notions of what engagement should look like (in which modernity is
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singular and fixed across space) is another way to get at this difference. I employ this
feminist geopolitical imaginary broadly as a grid of intelligibility to analyze the military
response to the attacks and the aftermath.
Michael Shapiro's (1996) critical take on international relations theory provides a
useful framework for mapping cultures of war. His work distinguishes between strategic
and ethnographic perspectives: strategic perspectives deepen identity attachments and
formal boundaries by treating them as ‘real,’ whereas ethnographic approaches aim to
unsettle such taken-for-granted attachments by questioning the boundary-making
narratives through which they are shaped.  Through ethnographic perspectives embedded
identities and strategic ways of seeing conflict and its consequences can be undone.
Likewise, a feminist geopolitics does not attempt to introduce new strategic perspectives
for mapping war, rather it attempts to challenge the binary between those perspectives
already entrenched, and ultimately dismantle it.
As Matt Sparke (2000) has argued, there are ‘real-worlders’ and more critical
geographers who are committed to revealing the relations of power that underwrite the
knowledge production of ‘real-worlders’. The real-worlders are unable to question the
premises on which their knowledge is enabled and limited. Critical geography, like
feminist geography, is committed to exposing the investments embedded in knowledge
production. A feminist geopolitics takes this deconstructive impulse one step further −
back into the 'real world' so to speak − so that identities, ways of seeing, and intervention
on the ground can also reconstruct alternative futures. Feminist geopolitics allow for  “new
ways of seeing, theorizing, and practicing the connections between space and politics and
between nature and culture” (Murphy Erfani, 1998).5  Such politics navigate between
nations and across space, cross-cutting the dominant framing of territorial sovereignty,
interrogating security as a concern not only for states, but also for the people who
comprise the citizenry of states. Moreover, I am concerned about the consequences of
‘terror’ for unsuspecting citizens on both ends of this continuum of violence.
Either/or—Neither/nor
In his televised address on September 20th, President Bush drew a clear line
between the two sides in ‘the war against terrorism’: “if you are not with us, you are
against us.” On October 7th, Osama Bin Laden stated that the world is divided into two
regions – one of faith and another of infidelity (Hensmen, 2001). Such binary thinking has
become part of the dominant geopolitical narrative, garnering support for both sides, and
leaving little space in between for those who fail to identify with either side. This narrative
device relies on what Chantal Mouffe (1995) has called 'the constitutive outside.' Subject
constitution and legitimacy require definition, something to define one’s project against.
Not only are such binaries logically questionable, they are also politically bankrupt,
reproducing the dominant geopolitical narrative as the only political option. “President
Bush’s ultimatum to the people of the world – ‘If you are not with us, you’re against us’ –
is a piece of presumptuous arrogance. It’s not a choice that people want to, need to, or
should have to make” (Roy, 2001a). In the aftermath of the attacks on September 11th, the
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 Murphy Erfani argues that classical geopolitics posits a neutral mind detached from the
body which observes space “objectively.”  Her own feminist geo-politics focus on the interstices of
mind and body as an inseparable borderland location of the corporeal subject (see pp. 5-6).
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existence of an antagonist and an enemy territory (i.e. Afghanistan) has been crucial to the
US government’s response. Evidence that fifteen of the nineteen men on the four hijacked
flights that crashed were Saudi nationals, and that Al Qaeda is a transnational network
with operatives in 34 countries, including Germany, the US, and Canada, has been glossed
over. A target was sorely needed and quickly identified.
Feminist political sociologist Cynthia Cockburn (2000) rejects the logic of
‘either/or’ militarization in the context of NATO attacks on the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia in 1999. As forces of the Milosevic government attacked ethnic Albanians in
Kosova/o, two option were presented:  either NATO attacks the Serbs (including some
civilian targets), or ethnic Albanians in Kosova/o will be annihilated. Cockburn contests
the militarized either/or ultimatum with a logic of her own, noting that “neither/nor” was
an option that received little attention (Cockburn, 2000).  The same feminist logic, I
contend, applies to the events and aftermath of September 11th: neither is the killing of
thousands of innocent civilians in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania warranted,
nor is the killing of thousands of innocent civilians in Afghanistan. The space to voice this
kind of dissent has, however, been highly restricted in North America since the attacks, a
point to which I will return.6
Few Degrees of Separation
A brief political geography of the Taliban and Osama Bin Laden’s early years also
breaks down the convenient shorthand of ‘either/or.’ Certainly, an analysis of the history
of all US foreign policy and its consequences is neither possible nor appropriate here, but
a brief survey of US foreign policy as it relates to the formation and activities of the
Taliban and Osama Bin Laden is surely justified. Mutually exclusive spaces of ‘here’ and
‘there’ and political dyads of ‘us’ and ‘them’ allow us to see the world more clearly, but
less honestly. Michel Chossudovsky (2001) attempts to unsettle the dominant geopolitical
narrative that emerged after the attacks of September 11th, highlighting instead the
connections between the US, the Taliban, and Osama Bin Laden. He notes that the largest
covert operation in the history of the CIA was launched in 1979 in response to the
invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union. Working together with the Pakistan Inter
Services Intelligence (ISI), the CIA actively encouraged political instability in Afghanistan
and beyond, with the idea that Muslim states could eventually defeat the Soviet Union.
Between 1982 and 1992, some 35,000 radicals from 40 Islamic countries joined
Afghanistan’s fight. Tens of thousands more went to study in madrassas (Koranic schools)
in Pakistan, as refugees fleeing the fighting in Afghanistan (Rashid, 1999).
Pakistan’s ISI was the go-between between the CIA and the Mujahadeen (which
included Osama Bin Laden) in Afghanistan. The CIA’s support was covert and indirect, so
as not to reveal its own geopolitical investments. While the Cold War began to fade and
Soviet troops withdrew in 1989, the Islamic jihad based out of Pakistan did not, and the
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 There are numerous examples to illustrate the policing of dissent in the North American
context alone. On September 11th, while watching the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's live
television coverage, I witnessed a reporter interview a US passenger who had been diverted to a
Canadian airport due to the attacks. When asked his opinion on the attacks, the passenger said that
the killings were tragic and that he had sympathy for the families affected, but that US foreign
policy was bound to produce consequences and that this was one result. Another passenger standing
beside him began hitting him with his carry-on luggage, and the camera panned away.
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civil war in Afghanistan continued unabated. Jane’s Defense Weekly (cited in
Chossudovsky, 2001) reported that “half of Taliban manpower and equipment originate[d]
in Pakistan under ISI.” What is more disturbing is that the Clinton Administration appears
to have known about links between Pakistani Intelligence (ISI) and Al Qaeda, including
the former’s use of Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan to train covert operatives for use in a
war of terror against India. The ‘evildoers’, as they have been called, were once US allies.
One can speak more accurately, then, about degrees of separation between the US and the
Taliban, than about historic enmity, longstanding hatreds, or the absence of political ties.
Just as Cold War geopolitics connected the US with Central Asia, the Taliban, and
indirectly to Osama bin Laden, tracing the geopolitics of oil interests goes some distance
in explaining the United States’ hands-off approach to the Taliban and its treatment of
women in Afghanistan, one which parallels US treatment of Saudi Arabia, its most
important oil ally. When the Taliban won control of Kabul in 1996, Washington said
nothing. In December 1997, Taliban leaders met with US State Department officials in
Washington and visited Houston, Texas to meet with UNOCAL oil executives (Pilger,
2001). “At that time the Taliban’s taste for public executions and its treatment of Afghan
women were not made out to be crimes against humanity” (Roy, 2001b). Assured access
for an oil pipeline from the Caspian Sea oil and gas reserves to the Indian Ocean would
decrease US reliance on Middle Eastern sources. Turkmenistan, which borders on
Afghanistan, holds the world’s third largest gas reserves and an estimated six billion
barrels of oil reserves. The desire for political stability in this region has a subtext.
The political economy of oil, underwriting an earlier war in the Persian Gulf,
combined US efforts to destabilize the USSR not so long ago, illustrate the geopolitical
designs of superpower on this region. Such designs shape what we see and hear in the
mainstream media. Conventional state-centred and resource-driven geopolitics promote a
dominant geopolitical narrative that ensconces the ‘us’/’them’ binary.7 Such politics
obfuscate minor voices and non-militarized responses to the attacks, and muffle dissent
where it finds expression. After September 11th, a dominant geopolitical narrative
generated all-knowing maps of meaning that have been disseminated through the
mainstream media. These god’s-eye cartographies of peopleless places, mostly in
Afghanistan, have mobilized consent for more violence in subtle ways. They enable
military manoeuvres to proceed, despite significant opposition to attacks that would harm
innocent civilians.8
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 The travesties of the Gulf War should be a reminder of the opportunism and expediency
with which alliances are forged. Neither Kuwait nor Iraq was a democratic country, but Kuwait's
'promise' of democracy were sufficient grounds to warrant forging an alliance for the sake of future
democracy (and oil). As Dan Hiebert reminds us, "the war became about fighting for the right of a
dictator to save "his" country from another dictator so eventually democracy could be introduced.
Of course all those democratic reforms were quickly forgotten at the end of the war" (personal
correspondence, 11 December 2001).
8
 In Canada, a poll taken in September before the bombing began, found that  73% of
Canadians (compared to 80% of Americans) favoured joining the United States in its battle against
terrorism. When asked if they approved of such a response if innocent civilians were killed, the
approval rate dropped to 43% (McCarthy, 2001). According to the poll, men are far more
supportive of the war against terrorism than women, with some 79 per cent of men supporting a war
on terrorism compared to 68% of women.
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Such maps construct particular sightlines that enable one to see ‘enemy’ positions
and movements via remotely-sensed satellite data, but omit images of the Afghan civilians
killed by the American and British attacks. Acts of omission are as much acts of
commission in this context, and more accountable maps are in short supply. Matt Sparke
(2001) has asked what other maps we might draw: “maps that might trace where bin
Laden’s financial support has come from over the years; maps that might show how he has
been ‘harbored’ by other states that the US would be much less inclined to bomb; and,
maps that show how the dead terrorists themselves were once ‘harbored’ in states across
America itself.” Maps that forge links and recognize extant networks among political
actors resist ‘either/or’ reasoning and have the potential to enhance their accountability.
Embodied Vision and Visible Bodies
Despite the valuable interventions of critical geopolitics, one of its shortcomings is
the highly disembodied mode of its critique (Sparke, 2000; Sharpe, 2000). In contrast,
embodied vision is ontologically committed and admittedly partial in perspective. Such
commitments do have the potential to subvert prevailing ways of understanding 'the
problem', actions that might have concrete effects on the lives of people who are players in
such events. A feminist geopolitics demands revisiting the horrific violence of September
11th and its aftermath, especially the casualties. The visibility, or lack thereof, of civilian
deaths contributes to a geopolitics of body counts.
Since September 11th I have read the short, often moving, biographies of hundreds
of the people killed, in The New York Times. Until the spring of 2002, an updated body
count of the people lost in the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and on the flights that
never arrived at their destination was published every Sunday.9 As an audience, the human
face of these horrific acts of violence in the US was everywhere apparent. It took a long
time, however, before the same paper began to publish photos of civilians who had lost
family members to the bombings in Afghanistan, and to cover controversial statistics
about how many civilians had been killed in that country by US military planes equipped
with smart and not-so-smart bombs (Bearak, 2002). The audible silence around the equally
preposterous deaths of a people already ravaged by war and, in many regions, starvation
was remarkable.
On January 3rd, 2002, a Canadian newspaper ran the headline, "Thousands of
Afghans likely killed in bombings" (Campbell, 2002a), more than a month before The
New York Times covered the same story. This first article cites an estimate by Dr. Marc
Herod, a New Hampshire economics professor, that 4,050 ordinary Afghans had been
killed to date based on media reports, some of which were unverified. Two weeks later a
similar story by the same reporter ran under the headline, "Afghanistan civilian toll
notably high: Death rate four times higher than it was in bombing of Kosovo, Serbia, study
says" (Campbell, 2002b). This report hints at the debate around the number of Afghan
civilians killed, citing the estimate of 1,000-1,300 by Project on Defense Alternatives in
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 In The New York Times on February 24, 2002, for example, "[o]fficials estimate that as of
Friday, 3,062 people had died, or were missing and presumed dead, as a result of the attacks on
Sept. 11, not including 19 hijackers."
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Cambridge, Massachusetts compared to the significantly higher figure cited by Dr. Herod.
Both figures and sources are cited in the February 10th article that appeared in The New
York Times.  An excerpt from this piece is worth citing at length:
Scrutiny has grown since a pre-dawn raid on Jan. 24, when U.S.
commandos killed at least 21 men presumed to be Taliban and Al Qaeda
fighters. Officials in the interim Afghan government have since joined
grieving survivors in calling the attack a tragic mistake, with some
surmising the Americans were duped with false information by a scheming
warlord….
Most often, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and military
spokesmen have dismissed accusations of mistakes as enemy propaganda.
They express confidence in their targeting and regret any "collateral
damage." They maintain that extraordinary efforts have been taken to
minimize civilian losses, something that even most critics of the war effort
would not dispute.
Nevertheless, certainly hundreds and perhaps thousands of innocent
Afghans have lost their lives during American attacks, a scattering of
bodies extraordinarily difficult to tabulate.
Many mournful Afghan families demand a reckoning.
"Tell me why our homes were destroyed and 55 people −  even little
children − are dead?" (Bearak, 2002; emphasis added).
The article goes on to say that an Air Force assessment team has reviewed several "scores"
of reports and acknowledged a handful of bomb malfunctions that led to unintended
casualties. It would seem that the installation of the interim government in Afghanistan
may have had a role in publicizing these fatal incidents.
Reports of civilian deaths in Afghanistan took time to filter back to the US
mainstream media, but once they did, an alarmingly visible landscape of death and
destruction emerged. Bearak (2002) chronicles attacks on five towns and villages,
'mysteries' that remain unresolved in which large numbers of civilians were killed. With
information from other reporters, his article discusses the questionable use of cluster
bombs, some of which fail to detonate on contact and are littered 'live' around the
countryside of Afghanistan.10 While the tragedies at both of ends of this violence are not
disproportionate, in terms of lives lost, the patriotic values placed on them (or not) vary
tremendously. Body counts provide a reality check: violence kills civilians and is
unwarranted wherever it occurs. Yet where is the space beyond retribution and the
'either/or' logic of militarization?
As Neil Smith (2002: 635) has argued, the "need to nationalize September 11 arose
from the need to justify war."  Smith argues that the World Trade Center catastrophe was a
profoundly local and also global event, yet it was produced as a national tragedy. This
politically strategic rescaling of September 11th serves at once to limit public and media
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 He also notes that approximately 60% of the 18,000 bombs, missiles and other ordnance
used between October 7, 2001 and February 10, 2002 were precision-guided, as compared to fewer
than 10% during the Gulf War.
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expression that questions government tactics of combating terrorism and forces citizens to
see these tactics as a matter of national interest and security.
The Privatization of Women in Public War
Women inside Afghanistan have been virtually invisible since the bombings began
on October 7th. Of course, Taliban rule between 1996 and 2001 ensured that
unaccompanied women were not found in public space. As I wrote the first draft of this
paper late in November 2001, media images of men in Afghanistan outnumber those of
women by at least 100 to one. Despite the ‘fall of Kabul’ to the Northern Alliance on
November 13th, the spectacle of celebrations has shown mostly men and boys celebrating
on the streets. The odd well-placed woman can be seen, uncovering her face (for example,
on the cover of The Globe and Mail, November 14th) or returning to paid work (for
example, on the cover of The National Post, November 14th), but both represent highly
charged notions of ‘progress’ published in Western, in this case Canadian, media. It was
not until Northern Alliance forces captured Kabul on November 13th, 2001 that the
Western media ‘celebrated’ women with uncovered faces walking on the street and
returning to jobs outside the home. Neither was the emancipation of Afghan women a
political objective until this apparent military victory. Nor is the emancipation of Saudi
women a political objective at this time. Promoting the greater civility and promise of the
Northern Alliance over the Taliban has been conducted with such enthusiasm that one
cannot help but be skeptical. As noted by Kathy Gannon (2001), the Northern Alliance has
no better record in its treatment of women than does the Taliban.
Without conclusion
The war on terrorism continues. In this context, feminist geopolitics represents a
third space, beyond the binaries of either/or, here/there, us/ them. As an ethnographic,
rather than a strategic, perspective it does not promote an oppositional stance in relation to
particular political principles or acts. Rather, as an analytic, it attempts to map the silences
of the dominant geopolitical position[s] and undo these by invoking multiple scales of
inquiry and knowledge production.  Scrutinizing the prevailing nation-state-centred
discourse of the war on terrorism is critical in recognizing the international and global
dimensions of the terror perpetrated on September 11 and in seeing the terror invoked on
Afghan civilians, in the name of justice.
In February 2002, Daniel Pearl, a Wall Street Journal reporter was abducted then
killed in Pakistan. His tragic death was no doubt fuel for the fire in the war on terrorism,
but the words of his wife upon his death are instructive:
Revenge would be easy, but it is far more valuable in my opinion to
address this problem of terrorism with enough honesty to question our own
responsibility as nations and as individuals for the rise of terrorism....
[I hope] I will be able to tell our son that his father carried the flag to end
terrorism, raising an unprecedented demand among people from all
countries not for revenge but for the values we all share: love, compassion,
friendship and citizenship, far transcending the so-called clash of
civilizations (The Globe and Mail, 2002).
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While the language of patriotism is clear in Ms. Pearl's commentary, her dismissal of
Samuel Huntington's clash of civilizations thesis makes it clear that her husband's death
should not become a justification for more violence, couched in the language of national
security.
Dominant geopolitical narratives shape what we see and hear in profound ways.
However, islands of opposition to the state-sponsored attacks on Afghanistan generate
snippets of hope that dissident voices have not been silenced. On September 15th, the
House of Representatives voted on a resolution permitting the President to use “all
necessary force against those nations, organization or persons he determines planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks” (Ibbitson, 2001). Defying
unprecedented unity in Congress, all but one member voted for this resolution. The sole
voice of dissent was lodged by Barbara Lee, congresswoman for the district of Berkeley
and Oakland. She has since received numerous death threats and hate mail. Her dissent
does not mean that women are categorically more peace-oriented than men. Many other
US congresswomen supported the resolution. Rather her position has to do with a
confluence between her politics and the geography of the district she represents. Berkeley
City Council was the first municipal government in the US to pass a resolution criticizing
the military campaign against Afghanistan. Its history of peace marches and anti-war
activism are well-known. Lee has taken a courageous stand in a climate of patriotism that
has been intolerant of criticism against the US government.11 Her stance has been
applauded by feminists from countries whose experience of terrorism span decades for her
ability to connect terrorism in the US with terrorism elsewhere (Cat’s Eye, 2001). There
are few degrees of separation between here and there, us and them, either/or. A feminist
geopolitics aims to trace the connections between geographical and political locations,
exposing investments in the dominant geopolitical rhetoric, in the pursuit of a more
accountable and embodied geopolitics that contests the wisdom of violence targeted at
innocent civilians, wherever they may be.
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